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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of trade liberalisation on the political sup-
port for policies that redistribute income between workers in different sectors.
We allow for worker heterogeneity and imperfect mobility of workers across
sectors, giving rise to a trade-off between redistribution and the inefficiency
of the labor allocation. We compare two environments, autarky and small
open economy, and present three main findings. First, redistributive policies
are more “likely” to arise in a small open than in a closed economy. Second,
if a redistributive policy is adopted in both situations, its nominal level is
higher in autarky than in the small open economy. Third, even though vot-
ers choose redistributive policies with lower nominal value in open economies,
the actual extent of redistribution in equilibrium is larger in the open than
in the closed economy. We discuss our results in the context of the debate
about the effects of globalisation on government activity.
Keywords: International trade, redistribution, political economy, factor
mobility
J.E.L. classification: F1, H2
∗Tilburg University, Department of Economics, PO Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg,
Netherlands. Tel. +31 13 466 2511, e-mail:G.C.L.Vannoorenberghe@uvt.nl.
†University of Mannheim, Department of Economics L 7, 3 - 5 68131 Mannheim, Ger-
many. Tel. +49 621 181 1795, e-mail: janeba@uni-mannheim.de.
1
1 Introduction
A common source of inefficiency of redistributive policies stems from their
heterogeneous impact on factor rewards across sectors and the resulting dis-
tortion in factor allocation between sectors (Saez (2004)). Subsidies to - or
bailouts of - particular industries have this heterogeneity at their core. One of
their typical aims, as far as their redistributive dimension is concerned, is to
raise the wage or maintain employment of workers in declining sectors. Other
policies, such as a progressive income tax, heterogeneous taxation of inputs or
unemployment benefits (Wright (1986)) also distort factor allocation across
sectors if these differ in their average wage, input mix1 or unemployment risk
respectively.
The present paper analyzes how trade liberalisation changes the effect
of and the political support for policies which redistribute income between
workers in different sectors. Although theses policies are generally consid-
ered inefficient ((Acemoglu and Robinson (2001)), they remain an important
channel through which governments across the world redistribute income or
support employment (e.g. Ford and Suyker (1990), OECD (2010), Rickard
(2012)). In developing countries, Rickard (2012) shows that their prevalence
increased over the 1980s and 1990s and that globalisation proved instrumen-
tal in driving this evolution. This may come as a surprise in light of the
extensive academic literature and public debate, which stress that globalisa-
tion imposes new constraints on governments’ ability to redistribute income
or protect their citizens through the welfare state2 (see Brady, Beckfield, and
1Examples include among many others fuel, electricity, and water subsidies, the absence
of kerosene tax, or differential taxation of capital and labor, which favor sectors intensive
in energy, water or capital respectively.
2For example, Wilson (1987) shows that the higher mobility of the tax base in an open
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Seeleib-Kaiser (2005) for a summary of the empirical literature).
The present paper however argues that, for cross-sectoral redistributive
policies, trade openness reduces the inefficiency associated with redistribution
and makes these policies less costly to implement. This in turn translates to
a stronger political support for redistribution in open economies and raises
the likelihood that redistribution arises in a voting equilibrium. We therefore
contribute to the positive analysis of the role of trade in shaping government
interventions in two ways. First, we focus on cross-sectoral redistribution, a
type of policies which, though widely used, has largely been ignored by the
literature. Second, we recognize that conflicts of interests are at the core of
redistributive policies and use a voting model to determine how the support
for redistribution is affected by international trade.
Our theoretical framework offers a number of novel features which allow
for a rich but tractable analysis. We assume that the economy consists of
different sectors producing under perfect competition and using exclusively
labor. The demand condition for each sector varies, thus setting the stage
for redistribution towards workers in sectors with low demand. To capture
the inherent trade-off of cross-sectoral redistribution, the key novelty is our
parsimonious modeling of the imperfect mobility of workers between sectors,
which builds on recent insights of the trade liberature on comparative advan-
tage3. If workers were perfectly mobile, there would be no conflict of interest
world limits the size of redistribution that a government can conduct, while Alesina and
Perotti (1997) point to the negative effects of redistribution on a country’s competitiveness.
Epifani and Gancia (2009) on the other hand argue that a terms of trade externality in
the financing of public goods may create a positive effect of trade openness on the size of
governments.
3We apply the Eaton and Kortum (2002) framework on comparative advantage to the
case of workers, see section 2.2. In line with earlier work on factor mobility (e.g. Grossman
(1983)), we measure the degree of labor specificity by the percentage loss in productivity
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as they would be made indifferent between sectors. If workers were tied to a
sector on the other hand (perfect immobility), a policy redistributing income
towards certain sectors would be very redistributive, but would carry no in-
efficiency as it would not affect the sectoral allocation of workers. Within
this framework we assume that workers determine the level of intersectoral
redistribution by majority voting. This creates a conflict of interest between
workers in sectors with low demand, who benefit from redistribution, and
workers in sectors with high demand, who lose. In this setup, redistribution
only arises in equilibrium if the majority of workers choose to work in low-
demand sectors, an outcome which depends among others on the relative
number of low-demand sectors in the economy.
The main conclusions of our model rest on the observation that a given de-
gree of cross-sectoral redistribution causes less inefficiency in an open than in
a closed economy. Loosely speaking, the domestic distortion implied by redis-
tributive policies is less costly when consumers can turn to foreign goods. If
the world price of low-demand goods is not too low, these lower costs of redis-
tribution translate into a stronger political support for redistribution, which
manifests itself along two margins: (i) the median voter is “more likely”4 to
vote for some redistribution in an open economy and (ii) if redistribution is
implemented, its extent - measured by the equilibrium ratio of wages in low
to wages in high demand sectors - is larger in an open economy. Although
seemingly intuitive, the fact that lower costs of redistribution cause a broader
political support for redistribution (the first margin) can only arise if there is
some degree of worker mobility in the economy5. Our model can accomodate
that workers incur when changing sector.
4The minimum share of low demand sectors for a redistribution to arise is lower in an
open economy.
5The contribution of our approach becomes clear when comparing our setup to a specific
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in a tractable way the changing political support for redistribution when an
economy opens to trade. We discuss a particularly interesting case of such
changing support in section 5, where we consider an environment in which
the world price of low demand good is much lower than in autarky. In such a
case, opening up to trade not only reduces the wage in low demand sectors,
but also induces workers to move to high demand sectors, thereby decreasing
the political support for redistribution. If this causes redistributive policies
to be abandonned, wage in low demand sectors further decrease.
Finally, our analysis shows that the nominal policy rate goes down when
opening up to trade. The usual empirical measures of cross-sectoral redis-
tributive policies - either the subsidy rate or the share of subsidies going to
low demand sectors as a share of GDP - both decrease in our model when
opening up to trade. The fact that actual redistribution (i.e. including the
general equilibrium effect) increases when opening up to trade while nominal
policies decrease can be reconciled by noting that opening to trade increases
the price elasticity of demand for all goods. In autarky, subsidizing a sector
raises the supply of its product and reduces its equilibrium price, thereby
limiting both the increase in that sector’s factor use and factor rewards. In a
small open economy, since prices are exogenous, the dampening effect of price
changes is absent. Any given policy rate is therefore both more redistributive
and more distortive in an open economy. These differences in redistributive
effects explain both why voters in an open economy choose a redistributive
factors model with two sectors and three types of workers (specific to low demand sectors,
to high demand sectors, and mobile between sectors). In such a model, the support for
redistribution is fixed: only workers specific to the low demand sectors favor redistribution.
Although opening up to trade reduces the costs of redistribution, the number of workers
supporting redistribution does not change and redistributive policies are only observed if
the exogenous share of workers specific to low demand sectors exceeds 50%.
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policy with lower nominal value than in autarky and why this policy can be
more redistributive than the one chosen in autarky.
In addition to existing studies on globalisation and the welfare state which
we mentioned earlier, the present paper relates to the literature on the dis-
tributive effects of international trade coming through a more elastic labor
demand. Rodrik (1997) points out that, by increasing competition in prod-
uct and factor markets, globalisation may raise the price elasticity of labor
demand, with potentially adverse consequences for workers. Empirically,
Slaughter (2001) finds strong evidence that the elasticity of labor demand
has increased between the 1970s and 1990s in the U.S., although he cannot
identify a strong effect of globalisation on this pattern (see also Krishna,
Mitra, and Chinoy (2001) and Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy (2007) for
empirical evidence. Spector (2001) shows how changes in elasticity matters
for redistributive polices in a standard income taxation model a` la Mirrlees.
In contrast to this literature, our approach shows that the more elastic labor
demand does not in itself affect the extent of redistribution, as voters can
choose a policy which cancels the real effect of a higher elasticity. Much more
central to our results is that consumers have the possibility to import goods
in an open economy. We also relate to the literature considering the effects
of international trade when factors are imperfectly mobile between sectors
or occupations (Kambourov (2009), Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010),
Ohnsorge and Trefler (2007)).
Section 2 describes the setup of the model. Section 3 solves the model
for a given redistributive policy, and describes the key differences between
the closed and open economy. Section 4 introduces the political dimension
of the model and endogenises the choice of policy. Section 5 conducts two
extensions and discusses the robustness of our results to a setup with more
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than two types of sectors and section 6 concludes.
2 The setup
2.1 Overview
The economy consists of a mass one of individuals who share the same Cobb-
Douglas utility function over N + 1 goods, indexed from 0 to N :
U =
N∏
n=0
qαnn (1)
where qn denotes the consumption of good n and
∑N
n=0 αn = 1. Individuals,
indexed by j, maximise utility subject to their income. Defining the economy-
wide income as I and the price of good n as pn, the aggregate demand for
good n is:
qDn = αn
I
pn
. (2)
We assume6 that xL of the N+1 goods enter the utility with a weight αn = αL
(the “low demand” goods) while xH goods have a a parameter αn = αH > αL
(the “high demand” goods), where xLαL + xHαH = 1. We denote the set of
sectors with low demand as XL and the set of sectors with high demand as
XH . Without loss of generality, we assume that sector 0 is a high demand
sector.
Each good is produced in a separate sector under conditions of perfect
competition. Labor is the only factor of production in the economy, and
all individuals in the model are workers, who supply inelastically one unit
of labor. The productivity of a unit of labor is specific to a worker-sector
pair: each worker independently draws a productivity parameter for each
6We relax this assumption in section 5
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sector. The distribution of productivty draws determines the typical loss
of productivity incurred by workers when changing sector, and indexes the
degree to which workers are sector-specific. The government can subsidise
sectors in which equilibrium wages are relatively low due to low demand
parameters (αL).
7 We do not explicitly model how and why demand is low
in some sectors. In a more general model, the demand parameters could be
the result of the realisation of a stochastic process. In section 3 we analyze
the effects of a given sectoral subsidy to low demand sectors, while in section
4 we assume that workers decide by majority voting on the size of these
subsidies. We characterise and compare the political-economy equilibria for
this economy when it is in autarky (all prices are endogenous) and when it
is a small open economy (output prices are given from the world market).
The timing of the model can be summarised as follows. At time t0, each
individual observes his vector of productivity draws for each sector n ∈ N .
At t1, individuals decide by majority voting on the level of redistribution
towards sectors with low demand. At t2, workers decide on the sectors in
which they want to work. We now turn in detail to each of the three steps
of the model.
2.2 Worker heterogeneity
Workers differ in their labor productivity, which is sector-specific. This makes
for a realistic situation and leads to heterogenous interests when voting over
7With a Cobb-Douglas utility, differences in sector-wide productivity would not affect
the share of total income spent on a particular sector. We concentrate on the Cobb Douglas
case and on demand heterogeneity for simplicity. All results of section 3 and 4 hold with
a CES utility when sectors have heterogeneous productivity parameters. Redistribution
in this case takes place towards sectors with a low productivity parameter.
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sectoral subsidies takes place. At time t0, each worker independently draws
a productivity parameter z for each sector from a Fre´chet distribution8:
F (z) = exp(−z−ν). (3)
Worker j obtains a vector of productivity draws, {zjn}Nn=0, which he observes.
zjn denotes the number of efficiency units of labor that worker j provides if he
works in sector n. The parameter ν > 0 affects the heterogeneity of produc-
tivity draws between sectors and provides a parsimonious way of capturing
the degree of sector-specificity of workers. If ν is low, the heterogeneity of
draws between sectors is large, and the percentage loss in productivity in-
curred by a worker changing sector is large.9 The parameter ν captures both
technological and regulatory reasons for the sector specificity of workers10.
2.3 Production and redistributive policies
Each sector consists of a large number of firms which behave in a perfectly
competitive manner both on the product and on the labor market. Produc-
tion in a sector equals the number of effective units of labor employed by the
sector (Λ)11:
yn = Λn. (4)
8For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the Fre´chet distribution has only one pa-
rameter, ν. The analysis can be generalised to allow the average z to be sector specific.
9This interpretation is the counterpart to that of comparative advantage made by Eaton
and Kortum (2002) in a trade context. Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) use the
Fre´chet distribution to model idiosyncratic shocks to the benefits of working in a particular
sector.
10In a dynamic perspective, the sector specificity of workers is similar to the concept of
mobility of workers between sectors.
11Allowing for productivity heterogeneity between sectors does not affect any of the re-
sults. See the working paper version Vannoorenberghe and Janeba (2013) for a production
function fo the form yn = ϕnΛn where ϕ captures the sector-specific productivity.
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To redistribute income towards workers in particular sectors, the govern-
ment can use a sector-specific sales tax or subsidy. Profits in sector n are
given by:
pin = [(1− τn)pn − cn]Λn (5)
where cn denotes the wage paid per unit of effective labor in sector n. An-
ticipating the equilibrium solution of the model, the zero profit condition is
given by:
cn = (1− τn)pn. (6)
Sector specific taxes (τn > 0) or subsidies (τn < 0) thus affect the wage per
unit of effective labor in n. For simplicity, and unless otherwise specified, we
will refer to cn as the “wage” in sector n in the rest of the analysis, which
should be understood as the wage per unit of effective labor in that industry.
Before proceeding, it is worth discussing the nature of taxation and re-
distribution in our model. As argued in the introduction, intersectoral re-
distribution is a general phenomenon. Often, support to specific sectors is
directly done, for example through price subsidies, bailouts or guarantees.
Agriculture, coal mining, or the car industry are typical recipients of such
policies. Subsidies to energy industries and the coal industry in particular are
widespread, see Victor (2009) for an overview and Frondel, Kambeck, and
Schmidt (2007) for Germany). Sometimes subsidies are more hidden and
are not directly targeted to particular sectors, but are in practice when they
are tied to characteristics of the production process (such as R&D, capital,
energy or skill intensity), which vary across sectors. The sales tax τn in our
model comes close to mimicking a price subsidy.
We assume that the government applies the same tax to all low demand
sectors (τL) and similarly to all high demand sectors (τH) and define for
simplicity βn as the policy parameter applying to sector n compared to that
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of sector 0 ∈ XH (τ0 = τH):
βn ≡ 1− τn
1− τ0 =
 1 if n ∈ XHβ if n ∈ XL (7)
where β ≡ (1 − τL)/(1 − τH). The parameter β determines the extent to
which low demand sectors are subsidized compared to high demand sectors.
If β > 1, low demand sectors are taxed relatively less (or subsidised relatively
more) than sectors with high demand.
Note that a policy β fixes the ratio of (1 − τL)/(1 − τH) but does not
fix the level of taxation, which depends on 1 − τH . The latter is defined by
the requirement that the policy be feasible, in the sense that the government
runs a balanced budget:
N∑
i=0
τipiΛi = 0⇔
N∑
i=0
βipiyi =
I
1− τ0 (8)
where the second equation uses the zero profit condition (6).
2.4 Sectoral choice of workers
At t2, individuals decide in which sector to work. They observe their id-
iosyncratic vector of sector-specific productivities {zjn}Nn=0 and the vector of
sectoral wages {cn}Nn=0. Worker j chooses to work in the sector which gives
him the highest income, which is the product of the wage in the sector times
the worker-sector specific productivity zjncn. As shown in the appendix 7.1,
the fraction of individuals deciding to work in sector n is:
Ln =
cνn∑N
i=0 c
ν
i
, (9)
which is also the supply of labor as the number of individuals is normalised to
one. Ln is increasing in the wage paid in sector n. On the other hand, a higher
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wage in other sectors makes employment in n relatively less attractive and
reduces Ln. The parameter ν represents a measure of the sector-specificity of
labor and determines the sensitivity of employment to relative differences in
wages between sectors. If ν is large, the productivity parameters drawn by
individuals for different sectors are similar, making the choice of sector very
dependent on the relative wages. The degree of sector specificity of workers
is in this case very low. If ν → 0, on the other hand, workers are fully sector-
specific and each sector employs 1/(N + 1) of the labor force regardless of
differences in wages.
Using the sectoral supply of labor, we show in the appendix 7.1 that the
supply of good n as given by (4) is equal to:
yn = ∆c
ν−1
n
(
N∑
i=0
cνi
) 1−ν
ν
(10)
where ∆ ≡ Γ(1− 1/ν) and Γ() denotes the gamma function. Sectors which
pay higher wages have a higher supply curve since they attract more workers.
For yn to be defined, we assume in the rest of the analysis that ν > 1. If
N is large, ν − 1 is the elasticity of the number of effective units of labor
employed in a sector with respect to the wage paid in that sector.12 Solving
for cn in (10) shows that the wage in n is increasing in yn and that the total
costs of production in sector n are convex. To expand, sector n needs to
attract workers who may be relatively more productive in other sectors, and
who therefore need to be paid a higher wage to accept working in sector n.
12Note that, as ν → 1, the allocation of labor remains sensitive to cn (see (9)) but the
amount of effective labor is not. For ν → 1, the differences in z are such that the workers
who join sector n following an increase in cn are infinitely less productive than the average
worker already in n, thereby increasing the production of n by zero percent.
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3 Economic equilibrium
In this section, we characterise the economic equilibrium for a given policy β,
first under autarky and then in a small open economy. Although we assume
that the vector β is exogenous, τ0 is endogenous and ensures the feasibility
of a particular policy β.
3.1 The autarkic equilibrium
In autarky, the market for each good must be in equilibrium, i.e. yn = q
D
n
for all sectors n. Using (2) and (10), the goods market equilibrium implies13:
cAn = (1− τ0)βnpAnd0 = (αnβn)
1
ν
IA
∆
(
N∑
i=0
αiβi
) ν−1
ν
(1− τ0) (11)
yAn = ∆(αnβn)
ν−1
ν
(
N∑
i=0
αiβi
) 1−ν
ν
(12)
where pAn and y
A
n are the price and the production in sector n in the autarkic
equilibrium and where βn is as defined in (7). Equation (11) shows the
wage obtained by workers in sector n. The wage and the production in a
sector n are increasing in the demand parameter (αn) of a sector and in the
redistributive policy towards it. The degree of worker mobility (ν) indexes the
relative extent to which these parameters affect wages or quantities produced.
From (11) and (12) the balanced budget constraint (8) in autarky can be
rewritten as:
1− τ0 = 1∑N
i=0 αiβi
(13)
13To obtain (11), we set qDn of (2) and yn of (10) equal. We then solve for c
ν
n and add
up over all n, which gives a solution for
∑
i c
ν
i . Plugging the solution back in q
D
n = yn and
rearranging gives (11).
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This condition, combined with (11) and (12), pins down the vector of prices
and of production in autarky for any given IA.14
3.2 The equilibrium in a small open economy
We now consider a small open economy facing a vector of exogenous prices
{pTn}Nn=0 set on the world market. We define IT as the total nominal income of
this economy. Since prices are fixed on the world market, the wage in sector
n is simply given by: cTn = (1− τ0)βnpTn . In a small open economy, domestic
supply and demand of a good are not necessarily equal. The equilibrium
production of a sector is determined by the supply equation given prices:
yTn = ∆(βnp
T
n )
ν−1
(
N∑
i=0
(βip
T
i )
ν
) 1−ν
ν
. (14)
Using (14) and rearranging, we can express the total nominal income of the
small open economy (IT ) and the balanced budget condition of the govern-
ment (8) respectively as:
IT =
N∑
i=0
pTi y
T
i = ∆
(
N∑
i=0
βν−1i (p
T
i )
ν
)(
N∑
i=0
(βip
T
i )
ν
) 1−ν
ν
(15)
1− τ0 =
(
N∑
i=0
βν−1i (p
T
i )
ν
)(
N∑
i=0
(βip
T
i )
ν
)−1
. (16)
To conduct a meaningful comparison between the small open and the
closed economy, we assume in the following that the world price distribution
is given by:
pTn =
IA
∆
α
1
ν
n ∀n, (17)
which implies that prices in the open economy are equal to autarky prices
with no redistribution (β = 1). Under this assumption, trade is “unbiased”
14Since we have not fixed any numeraire, total income - which is the sum of wages paid
to all workers - can take any value.
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in the sense that (a) the efficient allocation of resources is identical in the
closed and open economy, (b) the total real income with no redistribution
is the same under the closed and the open economy and (c) if β = 1 in the
open economy, no international trade takes place.
3.3 Redistributive policies and distortion
From the equilibrium cAn (β) and c
T
n (β) derived above, the ratio of wages
between low and high demand sectors in autarky and in an open economy is
respectively given by:
cAL(β)
cAH(β)
=
(
αLβ
αH
) 1
ν cTH(β)
cTH(β)
= β
(
αL
αH
) 1
ν
, (18)
where, with a slight abuse of notation, we use the subscripts L and H to
denote a sector n ∈ XL and n ∈ XH respectively. If β = 1, it is immediate
that the wage is higher in high demand sectors. The set of policies that
we consider are those which redistribute income towards sectors with lower
wages, i.e. we restrict attention to β ≥ 1. Redistributive policies should
also not make high demand sectors worse off than low demand sectors. We
therefore impose β < (αH/αL) under autarky and β < (αH/αL)
1
ν under an
open economy. The closer to one is the ratio cL/cH , the more redistribution
there is in the economy.
Before proceeding with the politico-economic equilibrium, we derive the
indirect utility of a worker j in sector n from (1) and (2):
V Sjn(β) = zjnu
S
n(β) = zjnD
S
n(β)R
S
n(β) (19)
DSn(β) ≡
cSn(β)
IS(β)
=
(1− τ0)βnpSn(β)
IS(β)
(20)
RS(β) ≡ IS(β)
N∏
i=0
ααii (p
S
i (β))
−αi (21)
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where S ∈ {A, T} indexes whether we are considering the autarkic or small
open economy case (“trade”). From the equilibrium derived in the previous
sections, pA(β) and IT (β) are functions of the policy β.
Equation (19) decomposes the indirect utility of worker j in sector n
between a common component to all workers in sector n, uSn(β), and an
idiosyncratic parameter representing the productivity draw of j in n, zjn.
The common component uSn(β), which is the real wage per effective unit of
labor in sector n (henceforth “real wage”) can further be decomposed into two
parts. The first, DSn(β), is the wage in sector n as a fraction of total income.
The impact of the policy on DSn(β), which captures the extent to which
workers in n benefit from the policy relative to others, is the redistributive
effect of the policy. The higher the DSL(β), the more redistribution there is
in the economy15. If DSL(β) > D
S
L(β
′), policy β is more redistributive than
β′. The second component, RS(β), is the total real income in the economy.
The impact of the policy on this second component captures the distortive
effect of the policy.
We first turn to the redistributive effect of the policy. Using (12), (14)
and (20), DSn is:
DSn(β) =
(
ySn (β)
) 1
ν−1 ∆−
ν
ν−1 , (22)
where ySn is increasing in β for low demand sectors and decreasing in β for high
demand sectors. A higher β (more redistributive policy) is thus equivalent
to a transfer from workers in high demand sectors to workers in low demand
sectors. As evident from (22), this redistribution happens by sustaining
output in low demand sectors and by decreasing output in high demand
sectors compared to laissez faire. This compression of output distribution
15Note that DSL(β) is increasing in c
S
L(β)/c
S
H(β) as I
S(β) =
∆
(
xL
(
cSL(β)
)ν + xH (cSH(β))ν) 1ν and DSL(β) = ∆−1 (xL + xH ( cSH(β)cSL(β)))− 1ν .
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across sectors implies a misallocation of resources in the economy.
DSn depends on the output of sector n in the same way in autarky and in
the small open economy. This implies that if the equilibrium output vector
is the same in autarky and in the open economy, the extent of redistribution
is also identical in the two cases. From (12) and (14), however, an increase
in β raises output in low demand sectors proportionately more in a small
open economy than in autarky. In autarky, the increased supply of good
n ∈ XL puts a downward pressure on its price - and therefore on the wage
in n - thereby limiting the inflow of workers to n. This dampening effect
of prices does however not occur in a small open economy, inducing more
workers to work in n than in autarky. A given nominal policy β is therefore
more redistributive in a small open economy as it has a stronger effect on
the output vector.
Lemma 1 Consider two policies, β and β′, such that β′ = βν. The output
vector and the share of total income accruing to each sector (the vector DSn)
are the same under policy β in a small open economy and under policy β′ in
autarky.
We now express the total real income of the economy as a function of
exogenous parameters and of the policy β, which is considered exogenous
in the present section. In autarky and in a small open economy, these are
respectively:
RA(β) =
N∏
i=0
(yAi (β))
αi = ∆ζ(xLαLβ + xHαH)
1−ν
ν βαLxL
ν−1
ν (23)
RT (β) = ζ
(
N∑
i=0
α
1
ν
i y
T
i (β)
)
= ∆ζ
αLxLβ
ν−1 + αHxH
(αLxLβν + αHxH)
ν−1
ν
. (24)
where ζ ≡ ∏i ααi ν−1νi . In both cases, there is no other distortion than the
redistributive policy and real income is maximised when β = 1. Any devi-
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ation from the efficient allocation distorts the output vector and creates a
misallocation of effective labor. RS captures the cost of this misallocation
in terms of real national income. The first part of equations (23) and (24)
shows that the mapping from a given vector of output to real income differs
between autarky and the small open economy. The reason is that a change
in the vector of production only distorts the supply side in the open economy
while it also distorts the demand side in the closed economy16.
To assess the distortive costs of a given effective redistribution in autarky
and in the open economy, we compare the (log) real income which obtain for
the same output vector in both situations:
Log(RA(β))−Log
(
RT
(
β
1
ν
))
= αLxL
ν − 1
ν
Log(β)−Log
(
αLxLβ
ν−1
ν + αHxH
)
(25)
The derivative of the above expression with respect to β - which corresponds
to changing the output vector in the same manner for the autarkic and the
open economy cases - is negative if β > 1. Since the right hand side of (25)
is equal to zero for β = 1, Log(RA(β))−Log
(
RT
(
β
1
ν
))
< 0. The following
Lemma summarizes these results:
Lemma 2 A given increase in yL/yH over its laissez-faire level decreases
real income proportionately more in autarky than in an open economy.
Loosely speaking, Lemma 2 states that a given domestic output distortion is
less costly for welfare when consumers do not only consume domestic goods.
16This effect can best be seen by taking an extreme example. Assume that the labor
allocation is such that no worker produces good n. In autarky, it implies that consumers
cannot buy good n, driving their utility to zero. In an open economy on the other hand,
consumers can still buy good n at the world market price, ensuring that their utility
remains positive.
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4 Political Equilibrium
In the previous section we characterised the economic effects of government
intervention via the nominal policy vector β. In this section, we endogenise
the choice of policy via a political process (requiring economic equilibrium
given policy choice) and define the winning policy as the one which beats all
other policies in a pairwise comparison. We assume that all individuals in
the economy vote on the policy β and that voting takes place at time t1, prior
to the sectoral work choice by individuals. Redistributive policies therefore
affect the sectoral choice of workers and give rise to economic distortions.
4.1 Pairwise policy comparison
The pairwise comparison of two policies is a non-trivial exercise as workers are
heterogenous after obtaining their distribution of sectoral productivity draws
(even though the draws come from the same (Fre´chet) distribution). When
considering his utility under a given policy vector, each worker, knowing his
own vector of sectoral productivity and the distribution of productivity in
the population, correctly solves the economic equilibrium described in the
previous section. In other words, each worker correctly anticipates in which
sector he would work given a policy β, as well as the prices which would
obtain under that policy. When comparing two policies, each individual
therefore votes for the one giving him the highest utility, knowing that a
deviation from the policy β to some other policy β′ involves a change of
worker allocation across sectors including his or her own choice. Formally,
worker j, with productivity draw zjn in sector n votes for policy β over policy
β′ if:
max
n
{zjnun(β)} > max
n
{zjnun(β′)} (26)
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where un(β), defined in (19), is the real wage in sector n given policy β. We
aggregate this condition across all workers to determine the condition under
which policy β is preferred by half of the population against policy β′ in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Define I1 as the set of sectors i for which ui(β) < ui(β
′) and
I2 as its complement. Policy β wins over policy β
′ if and only if:∑
i∈I2
(ui(β))
ν >
∑
i∈I1
(ui(β
′))ν (27)
Proof: See Appendix 
Proposition 1 reduces the problem of determining which of two policies
wins a vote to a condition involving only the sector-wide real wages (un(β)).
This considerably reduces the dimension of the problem, as it allows to ab-
stract from tracking the individual productivity draws (zji) and sectoral de-
cisions.
Two elements play a role in determining which of two policies win. First,
the number of sectors in which policy β is preferred to β′ matters (the relative
size of the sets I1 and I2), as would be the case in models where voters are
fully specific to a sector. Second, since workers have some degree of mobility
between sectors, the mass of workers deciding to work in a particular sector
depends on the real wage (un(β)) in that sector. If the sectors preferring
β to β′ offer a relatively high real wage, more workers are likely to work in
these sectors and to vote for β. To further clarify the importance of mobility
in (27), consider the workers who choose sector i ∈ XH under β′. When
deciding to vote for β to β > β′, these workers not only consider whether
sector i would benefit from policy β, but also whether they should switch to
a sector n ∈ XL, which benefits from β more than sector i. If their expected
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net income in n under β is higher than in sector i under β′, they favor policy
β over β′. Equation (27) aggregates these choices to determine which policy
wins. It is worth noting that a worker choosing sector i under β′ would only
switch to n under β if his draw of zjn is not too far from zji. The lower the
heterogeneity of z between sectors (the higher the ν), the more the mobility
matters and the more sensitive is the comparison between sectors. This is
reflected by the exponents in (27).
4.2 Politico-economic equilibrium
In a first step, we ask what is the preferred policy of a worker given that
it works in a low (respectively high) demand sector, i.e. what policy β
maximizes uL(β) (respectively uH(β)), where we use the subscripts L and
H to denote a sector n ∈ XL and n ∈ XH respectively. In a second step,
we show that there exists a unique policy beating all others in a pairwise
comparison.
First, we note that, both in autarky and in a small open economy, work-
ers in high demand sectors favor policy β = 1 (no redistribution) over any
other policy. Workers in high demand sectors are harmed from redistributive
policies as they are net contributors to the government’s budget and lose
from their distortive effect. Formally, this is obtained by showing that the
first derivative of uSH(β) is negative for any feasible β.
We then turn to workers in low demand sectors. The real wage in these
sectors is given by uSL = D
S
LR
S for S ∈ {A, T}, where DSL obtains by plugging
(12) and (14) in (22) and where RS is given by (23) and (24). In contrast
to high demand sectors, workers choosing to work in low demand sectors
benefit from the redistributive effect of the policy, although they lose from
its distortive effect. For β close to 1, the marginal redistribution is first-
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order while the distortive effect is second-order, meaning that workers in low
demand sectors want at least some redistribution. Two factors however limit
the size of the redistributive policy from the perspective of workers in low
demand sectors. First, the distortive effect of redistribution is convex in β,
limiting the redistribution they wish to implement. Second, the wage in low
demand sectors should not surpass that in high demand sectors. Setting
∂uSL(β)/∂β = 0 shows the unique value of β, defined as β
S
L , that maximizes
income per efficiency unit in low demand sectors under autarky and trade17:
βAL = min
(
1 +
1
(ν − 1)αLxL ,
αH
αL
)
(28)
xHαH = xLαL
(
βTL
)ν−1 (
βTL (ν − 1)− ν
)
(29)
where βTL is defined as the minimum between the implicit solution to (29)
and (αH/αL)
1
ν .
The above equations highlight two characteristics of the preferred redis-
tributive policy for workers in low demand sectors. First, redistribution is
less attractive the higher the mobility of labor. The reason is twofold: (i)
the distortion of the output vector is stronger the larger the labor mobility
and (ii) the redistribution is less strong under higher mobility as the inflow
of workers into subsidised sectors limits the possible wage increase in these
sectors. Second, βAL is weakly decreasing in αLxL. From the perspective of
workers in XL, the redistributive gain of the policy decreases in the number
of workers in XL, as the fraction of net contributors to the policy decreases.
The following Lemma offers a comparison of the preferred policy of workers
in low demand sectors between autarky and the open economy.
17To show that this value is unique, take the second derivative of uSn(β) with respect
to β and plug βSL in. The sign of this expression is negative, which implies that if the
first derivative is equal to zero, the second derivative is negative and that uSn(β) is single
peaked.
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Lemma 3 The bliss policy in low demand sectors is such that β
A 1
ν
L ≤ βTL <
βAL where the first inequality is strict as long as β
A
L < αH/αL.
Proof: See Appendix 
The above Lemma shows that, in an open economy, workers in low demand
sectors prefer a policy with a smaller nominal level but a greater redistribu-
tion (by Lemma 1) than in autarky. As shown in Lemma 2, a given redistri-
bution is less costly to attain under a small open economy as the distortive
effect of redistribution is dampened by the availability of foreign goods. By
Lemma 1, on the other hand, since a smaller nominal policy is needed to
obtain a given redistribution, workers in low demand sectors prefer a lower
nominal policy rate than in autarky. Observing a drop in the subsidy rate
towards certain sectors when an economy opens up to trade does therefore
not necessarily mean that redistribution is less intense, and may in fact be
associated with stronger redistribution18.
We now turn to the second step, which is to prove that there is a unique
equilibrium policy given the parameters of the model and that this policy
must be either β = 1 (the preferred policy of high demand sectors) or β = βSL ,
the preferred policy in low demand sectors. The proof consists of two steps.
First, consider the case where policy βSL beats policy β = 1, i.e. xL(uL(β
S
L))
ν−
18Empirical studies on the prevalence of industrial subsidies (e.g. Ford and Suyker
(1990)) typically look at the amount of sectoral subsidies as a share of GDP (which is
given in our model by ΘS(βSL) ≡ −xLτLpSLySL/IS evaluated at βSL) rather than the sub-
sidy rate β. Using the equilibrium βSL as derived in (28) and (29) as well as the price,
output and income functions derived in section 3 shows that ΘA(βAL ) = xHαHν and
ΘT (βTL ) = xHαHν
(
xLαL
(
βTL
)ν−1 + xHαH)−1 < ΘA(βAL ) if βTL and βAL are interior, and
that ΘT (βTL ) < Θ
A(βAL ) also holds if the policy rates are maximum. Just as the nominal
rate, subsidies as a share of GDP are therefore larger in autarky than in the open economy
although redistribution is less strong in autarky.
23
xH(uH(1))
ν > 0 by Proposition 1. Since xH(uH(1))
ν > xH(uH(β))
ν for any
β > 1 (β = 1 is the bliss policy in high demand sectors), policy βSL strictly
beats any other policy. A similar reasoning shows that if policy β = 1
beats βSL , it strictly beats any other policy. It remains to check under which
condition βSL wins over β = 1, a step conducted in the following Proposition,
where χS is the unique value of αLxL for which xL(u
S
L(β
S
L))
ν = xH(u
S
H(1))
ν .
Proposition 2 Equilibrium policy
For S ∈ {A, T}, the equilibrium policy is given by:
βS =
1, if αLxL < χSβSL , if αLxL ≥ χS (30)
where βSL is defined by (28) and (29).
Proof: See Appendix 
The product αLxL is a direct determinant of the mass of workers in sectors
with low demand and needs to be large enough for the redistributive policy
to win by majority voting. If this is the case, the winning policy is βSL while
there is no redistribution otherwise. We now turn to our main result, which
compares the equilibrium policies under trade and autarky.
Proposition 3 Comparison of policies under autarky and small open econ-
omy.
1. For any ν, χT < χA, that is, redistribution is more “likely” to occur in
the small open economy;
2. Conditional on redistribution taking place under autarky and in the
open economy, the nominal policy is higher in autarky but redistribution
is stronger in the open economy.
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Proof: See Appendix 
Under a small open economy, redistribution is more likely to take place
and, conditional on redistribution happening, redistribution is stronger (DTL(β
T
L ) >
DAL (β
A
L )) than in autarky. As emphasized earlier, the inefficiency attached
to a given redistribution is smaller under an open economy as the domestic
distortion is less important when goods can be imported (Lemma 2). Propo-
sition 3 shows that this lower inefficiency in an open economy raises equi-
librium redistribution through two margins: (i) it translates into a broader
political support for redistribution and (ii) it raises the level of redistribution
conditional on it being supported by the median voter. Although seemingly
intuitive, Part 1 of Proposition 3 would not obtain in a standard model with
specific factors as it requires some degree of labor mobility across sectors.
If workers were immobile, the fraction of workers supporting redistribution
would be exogenously given by the fraction of workers in low demand sec-
tors. Moving from autarky to trade would in this case not affect the likeli-
hood that redistribution wins by majority voting. In our setup with labor
mobility, however, some workers who vote against redistribution and work
in high demand sectors under autarky prefer to vote for redistribution - as
it is less inefficient - in an open economy and work in low demand sectors.
This mechanism, which is stronger the higher the ν is key to obtain changes
in the political support for redistribution when opening to trade.
5 Extensions
5.1 Comparative advantage
We assumed in the previous sections that trade is “neutral” in the sense that
the world prices in the open economy are equal to the equilibrium autarky
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prices without redistribution (β = 1). In the present section, we relax this
assumption and allow some sectors to benefit more than others from trade
openness. We replace (17) by:
pTL =
IA
∆
δα
1
ν
L p
T
H =
IA
∆
α
1
ν
H ∀n, (31)
where the previous analysis assumed that δ = 1. To keep the analysis
tractable, we assume that all low demand sectors have the same parameter
δ. If δ > (<)1, the country has a comparative advantage19 in the sectors for
which it has a low (high) domestic demand. We further impose for simplicity
that αLδ < αH , which guarantees that p
T
L < p
T
H . In other words, sectors with
a relatively high price under autarky still obtain a relatively high price in
a small open economy. The ratio of wages in low and high demand sectors
becomes:
cTL(β)
cTH(β)
= βδ
(
αL
αH
) 1
ν
. (32)
Replicating the previous analysis shows that the bliss policy for low demand
sectors is βTL (δ), implicitly defined by:
xHαH = xLαLδ
(
βTL
)ν−1 (
βTL (ν − 1)− ν
)
. (33)
or by βTL (δ) = δ
−1(αH/αL)
1
ν if the value implied by (33) is larger. An in-
crease in δ has a direct and an indirect effect on the relative wage in low
demand sectors. The direct effect of trade is to raise the price of the low
demand good, increasing the relative wage of low demand sectors. The in-
direct effect, obtained by totally differentiating (33), is to make policies less
redistributive (βT
′
L (δ) < 0). The reason is that workers in low demand sectors
19We define “comparative advantage” based on a comparison of world and autarky prices
for β = 1, i.e. the home country has a comparative advantage in low demand goods if
pAL(1)/p
A
H(1) < p
T
L/p
T
H .
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are benefiting less from redistribution if the laissez-faire wage differences are
smaller, which also explains why βSL in (28) and (29) is decreasing in αL.
As shown in Proposition 4, the direct effect dominates and an increase in δ
reduces the wage difference between high and low demand sectors. Although
a higher δ reduces the size of a winning redistributive policy, we show in
Proposition 4 that it raises the likelihood that redistribution occurs. A high
δ, by increasing the price pTL, raises both the wage and employment in sectors
n ∈ XL, which translates into more support for redistributive policies. The
following Proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4 Comparative advantage
1. A higher δ reduces the equilibrium policy (∂βTL (δ)/∂δ < 0), but raises
the relative wage of low demand sectors in equilibrium (∂(δβTL (δ))/∂δ >
0)
2. Redistribution in a small open economy is more “likely” the larger the
δ (χ′T (δ) < 0).
3. There is a δ∗ < 1 below which redistribution is less “likely” in an open
economy than in autarky (χT (δ) > χA for δ < δ∗).
Part 3 of Proposition 4 makes for a particularly interesting case. Consider
a country with a strong comparative advantage in the high demand sectors
(δ << 1) but a relatively large number of low demand sectors such that
χT (δ) > αLxL > χA. In autarky, the equilibrium policy is β
A
L and redistri-
bution takes place. When opening to trade, such a country sees the relative
wage in low demand sectors drop for two reasons: (i) a low δ directly reduces
the wage and employment in the low demand sectors, and (ii) the decrease
in employment from the direct effect implies that the median voter does not
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support redistributive policies anymore, creating a further decrease in wage
and employment of low demand sectors.
5.2 More than two types of sectors
Although the previous sections depicted a world with two types of sectors,
a large part of the analysis in sections 3 and 4.1 directly applies to more
general distributions of αn. First, equations (1) to (24), which describe the
setup and the economic equilibrium, hold for any distribution of αn when
defining β as the vector of βn = (1 − τn)/(1 − τ0) (L and H in (18) should
also be replaced by n and n′). An extended version of Lemmas 1, 2 and
3 also holds20 for any distribution of αn. Second, the condition derived in
Proposition 1 for a policy to win over another by majority voting also holds
for any distribution of αn.
Showing that there exists a unique equilibrium policy however requires
additional assumptions once we allow for more than two types of sectors.
If there are three types of sectors or more, a policy is a vector of βn which
cannot be characterized by a unique parameter. To circumvent that problem
but allow for more than two types of sectors, we assume that a redistributive
policy takes the following form:
βn =
(
α0
αn
)b
, (34)
where individuals vote over the policy parameter 1 > b > 0. When voting
on b, voters choose their preferred level of redistribution across sectors in the
20The concept of redistribution has to be made more precise when considering an ar-
bitrary distribution of α, and we think of redistribution as a compression of the income
distribution in the sense that the ratio of wages between any two sectors becomes closer to
one. A precise description of how section 3 extends to any distribution of α can be found
in Vannoorenberghe and Janeba (2013).
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economy without being able to specifically target one sector. Plugging (34)
in (11) and in βnp
T
n with p
T
n defined by (17) gives:
cAn (b)
cAn′(b)
=
(
αn
αn′
) 1−b
ν cTn (b)
cTn′(b)
=
(
αn
αn′
) 1
ν
−b
. (35)
The larger the b, the more compressed is the distribution of effective wages
across sectors, i.e. the more redistributive the policy. Maximum redistribu-
tion is attained for a parameter b = 1 in autarky and b = 1/ν in a small
open economy, in which case the wages in all sectors are equalized. As in
the previous sections, a given b causes a stronger redistribution in an open
economy than in autarky.
Assuming a policy function as in (34) is however not sufficient for the
existence of a unique political equilibrium. To better understand the condi-
tions under which a political equilibrium exists, consider two feasible policies
b1 and b2 with b2 > b1 and denote the distribution of α by F (α) with support
[α, α¯]. From (27), the condition for policy b2 to win over b1 is:∫ α˜S(b1,b2)
α
(uS(α, b2))
νdF (α)−
∫ α¯
α˜S(b1,b2)
(uS(α, b1))
νdF (α) > 0 (36)
where α˜S(b1, b2) is implicitly defined by u
S(α˜, b1) = u
S(α˜, b2) if it is interior.
For ease of exposition, we denote in the following low (high) demand sectors
as those sectors with α < α˜S(b1, b2) (α > α˜
S(b1, b2)). An important condition
to determine the existence and nature of an equilibrium is whether policy b2
beats any policy lower than b1 if (36) holds. Starting from a situation where
(36) holds, it is sufficient for b2 to beat a policy lower than b1 that the
derivative of the left hand side with respect to b1 be negative, i.e. that:
2
∂α˜S(b1, b2)
∂b1
(uS(α˜, b1))
νf(α˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive margin
−
∫ α¯
α˜(b1,b2)
∂
(
uS(α, b1)
)ν
∂b1
dF (α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive margin> 0
< 0. (37)
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When b1 decreases, workers in sectors with high demand (α > α˜(b1, b2)) are
more strongly in favor of b1 as they on average gain from lower redistribution.
Keeping α˜(b1, b2) constant (i.e. keeping the set of sectors in which b2 is
preferred to b1 constant), a lower b1 raises the average utility from working in
a high demand sector, and induces some workers previously in low demand
sectors to switch to high demand sectors and support b1. We denote this
effect the “intensive margin” as it keeps α˜S(b1, b2) constant. The second
effect arising after a decrease in b1 is a change in the set of sectors favoring
b2 and b1 (the “extensive margin”). For (37) to hold, a decrease in b1 should
raise α˜S(b2, b1) sufficiently, i.e. increase the number of sectors preferring b2
to b1 sufficiently for b2 to win.
In section 4, the inequality (37) is violated as the extensive margin is
zero in the relevant21 range of policy [1, βSL ]: for any two policies in that
range, workers in high demand sectors prefer the less redistributive while
workers in low demand sectors choose the more redistributive one. In that
case, if βSL beats β = 1, it beats any intermediate policy 1 < β < β
S
L . This
explains the form of the equilibrium in section 4, where the selected policy is
either no redistribution or the bliss point of the low demand sectors. With a
different assumption on the distribution of α, however, we can impose that
the extensive margin is negative enough to guarantee that if b2 beats b1, it
beats any policy b0 < b1
22.
Proposition 5 Assume that the demand parameter α ∈ [(κ − 1)/κ,∞) is
Pareto distributed with density f(α) = κ1−κ(κ−1)κα−κ−1 and a shape param-
eter κ > 2. If ν ≥ 1.101, there exists a unique equilibrium policy which beats
21Policies larger than β > βSL are strictly dominated by β
S
L as all workers would prefer
βSL to them.
22In a similar way, we check in the appendix 7.7 that when the extensive margin is
negative enough, if b1 beats b2 > b1, it beats any b3 > b2.
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all others pairwise. It is given in autarky and in the small open economy
respectively by:
bA = min
(
(1− Log(2))κ− 1
ν − 1 , 1
)
(38)
bT = min
(
1− Log(2)
Log(2)
κ− 1
ν − 1 ,
1
ν
)
(39)
Proof: See Appendix 
The support of the Pareto distribution in Proposition 5 is chosen to ensure
that E[α] = 1 and preserve constant returns to scale in utility. The conditions
on κ and ν are sufficient to ensure that the extensive margin is negative
enough and that (37) holds for any two feasible policies b1 and b2. A few
remarks are in order. First, for the same reasons as in the case with two types
of sectors, the equilibrium redistributive policy is smaller when workers are
more mobile between sectors (higher ν). Second, the larger the κ, the lower
the dispersion of α across sectors and the larger the fraction of sectors below
a certain demand parameter. A high κ means that low demand sectors
are strong in the population, and choose a more redistributive policy. In
section 4, with two types of sectors, a higher prevalence of low demand
sectors (higher αLxL) had two opposite effects (see (28) and (29)): (i) it
tended to decrease the policy level βSL , but (ii) made it more likely that a
redistributive policy was chosen. Under the Pareto assumption, both these
effects are combined and reflected in the parameter κ. The second effect
dominates if the extensive margin is strong, meaning that a higher κ raises
redistribution. Third, bT > bA, which implies that, as with two sector types,
redistribution is stronger in an open economy, i.e. the ratio cSn(b
S)/cSn′(b
S) in
(35) with bS as defined in (38) and (39) is closer to one in an open economy
than in autarky. The structure of the equilibrium policy is here different from
section 4, as some redistribution takes place for any κ and the “likelihood”
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that a policy is chosen is now one in a closed and an open economy. It should
however be noted that the endogenous shifts in political support, which were
governing the changes in likelihood in section 4 are still contributing to the
increase in redistribution in the present case. Fourth, although the nominal
policy bT is larger than bA for some parameters, it can be shown23 that the
share of GDP spent on transfers to subsidy recipients is weakly lower in an
open than in a closed economy.
The results of Proposition 5 offer an interesting robustness test to our
main results of section 4 and confirms that our model extends to more ad-
vanced settings, and in particular to cases where the “extensive margin”
dominates the “intensive margin” on the whole range of feasible policies. For
many distributions of α, however, the “extensive margin” dominates only
on some range, which can give rise to well-known issues of circularity and
non-existence of equilibria when there are more than two types of sectors. A
case by case approach is then needed to determine whether an equilibrium
exists24.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have adopted a general equilibrium perspective on sectoral
redistribution policies, which are prevalent in many countries and situations.
The key theoretical tool was the modelling of partial labor mobility or sec-
toral specificity, which means that heterogenous workers respond to wage
23Proofs are available from the authors upon requiest.
24Unreported numerical simulations show for example that, assuming three types of
sectors (i.e. a distribution of α with three mass points), a unique equilibrium exists for a
very large parameter range but that issues of non-existence can arise for some particular
values of α.
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differences across sectors, but not completely and not in the same way. Re-
distribution policies thus favor some workers, but at a cost of allocational
inefficiency, which workers need to take into account when they vote over
policies. This flexibile framework allows us to compare policies at two ex-
treme ends of openness to international trade: no trade and the small open
economy with given world market prices. We expect that results for an open
economy with some pricing power would lie between these two situations,
although this claim would have to be proven in future research.
Our main findings make clear that the relationship between openness and
redistribution is complex and multi-dimensional. We show that in political
equilibrium redistribution is more likely to occur in the open economy in
the sense that it takes fewer sectors with low demand parameters to make
redistribution attractive compared to no trade. Yet, when redistribution
takes place in both situations, the nominal or face value in the small open
economy is smaller, even though the redistributive effect - once general equi-
librium effects are taken into account - is larger. International trade increases
the elasticity of labor demand, which magnifies the effects of a given redis-
tribution policy, and reduces the inefficiency of a given labor misallocation
because consumer prices are not (or less) distorted.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of Ln and yn in (9) and (10)
If worker j receives a productivity draw z in sector n, the probability that
it is best to work in n is the probability that the draws of zi in all others
sectors are lower than cnz/ci:
G
(
cnz
ci
)
≡
∏
i 6=n
F
(
cnz
ci
)
= exp
(
−(cnz)−ν
(∑
i 6=n
(ci)
ν
))
. (40)
The supply of workers in sector n is given by the integral over all z of the
probability that a draw of z makes it optimal to work in n, i.e.:
Ln =
∫ ∞
0
G
(
ciz
cn
)
dF (z) =
cνn∑N
n=1 c
ν
i
. (41)
The supply of goods from sector n is the total effective labor in n, i.e.:
yn =
∫ ∞
0
zG
(
ciz
cn
)
dF (z) = ∆cν−1n
(
N∑
i=0
cνi
) 1−ν
ν
. (42)
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 consists of three steps. In the first step, we
derive the probability (pi(zji)) that worker j prefers policy β to β
′ conditional
on (i) the fact that sector i is his preferred sector under policy β′ (ii) his
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idiosyncratic productivity draw in i is zji. In a second step, we relax the
second part of the conditional exercise above and ask what is the probability
(pi) that a worker prefers policy β given that he works in sector i under policy
β′. Finally, the third step derives the unconditional probability (p) that a
worker prefers policy β to β′. Since the economy consists of a continuum of
agents, this is also the fraction of workers who prefer β to β′.
• Step 1
Assume that, for worker j, zjiui(β
′) = maxn{zjnun(β′)}, meaning that
under policy β′, worker j works in sector i. In Step 1, we derive the proba-
bility that worker j prefers policy β over β′.
If ui(β) > ui(β
′), worker j prefers policy β for sure (even if i may not
be the best choice of sector under policy β). If ui(β
′) < ui(β) on the other
hand, he finds policy β better than β′ if for at least one sector n 6= i :
zjnun(β) > zjiui(β
′). Conditional on i being the best sector for worker j
under policy β′, the probability that j prefers policy β2 to β1 is:
pi(zji) = I{ui(B2) < ui(B1)}
(
1−
N∏
n 6=i
Probc (un(B2)zjn < ui(B1)zji)
)
+ I{ui(B2) > ui(B1)} (43)
with I the indicator function and Probc() the conditional probability operator
Prob( |zjnun(β1) < zjiui(β1)). Probc (un(β)zjn < ui(β′)zji) is the probability
that zjn < zjiui(β
′)/un(β) given that zjn < zjiui(β′)/un(β′). It is equal to
one for all sectors n ∈ I1. For sectors n ∈ I2 it is:
Probc (un(β)zjn < ui(β
′)zji) = exp
(
−(zjiui(β′))−ν
(∑
n∈I2
(un(β))
ν − (un(β′))ν
))
,(44)
37
which implies:
pi(zji) = 1−I{ui(β) < ui(B1)}exp
(
−(zjiui(β′))−ν
(∑
n∈I2
(un(β))
ν − (un(β′))ν
))
.
(45)
• Step 2
In the second step, we ask what is the probability (pi) that a worker
prefers policy β given that he chooses to work in sector i under policy
β′. For a given z in i, the probability that i is the best choice under
β′ is the probability that for all n 6= i, zjnun(B1) ≤ zui(B1), which is
exp[−(zui(B1))−ν
∑
n6=i(un(B1))
ν ]. Integrating all z gives the probability
that i is the best sectoral choice under β′. We define the density function
hi(z) as the probability that a worker has productivity z in i, conditional on
i being its choice of sector under β′:
hi(z) =
νz−ν−1exp(−z−ν)exp
(
−(zui(β′))−ν
∑
n6=i(un(β
′))ν
)
∫
νζ−ν−1exp(−ζ−ν)exp
(
−(ζui(β′))−ν
∑
n6=i(un(β
′))ν
)
dζ
. (46)
The conditional density hi(z) shows that, if i is the best sector for a worker
under β′, the likelihood that the worker has drawn a given z depends on
both (i) the unconditional likelihood to draw z (given by νz−ν−1exp(−z−ν))
and (ii) the likelihood that z is sufficient to make i the best choice under β′,
which is larger the higher the z. The probability (pi) that a worker prefers
policy β given that he chooses to work in sector i under policy β′ is:
pi =
∫
pi(z)hi(z)dz. (47)
Using (45) and integrating gives:
pi = 1− I{ui(β′) > ui(β)}
∑N
n=1(un(β
′))ν∑
n∈I2(un(β))
ν +
∑
n∈I1(un(β
′))ν
. (48)
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• Step 3
To obtain the fraction (p) of workers who find policy β better than β′, we
take the sum of pi over all i weighted by the likelihood that sector i is the
best choice of policy under β′25. This yields:
p =
∑
n∈I2(un(β))
ν∑
n∈I2(un(β))
ν +
∑
n∈I1(un(β
′))ν
. (49)
Setting p ≥ 1/2 generates Proposition 1.
7.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Equation (29) can be rewritten as:[
1
xLαL(ν − 1) + 1−
(
βTL
)ν]
+
ν
ν − 1
((
βTL
)ν−1 − 1) = 0. (50)
By definition of a redistributive policy, βTL ≥ 1, which implies that the left
hand side above is weakly decreasing in βTL . At β
T
L = 1, the left hand side is
positive. It must therefore be the case that βTL > 1 for the above equation to
hold. If the square bracket were equal to zero, with βTL and β
A
L interior, we
would have that βTL =
(
βAL
) 1
ν . In this case, the redistribution and the output
vector would be the same in the open and in the closed economy case. The
additional term to the square bracket on the left hand side is positive for
βTL > 1 and reflects the fact that a given distortion of the output vector is
less costly in an open economy. It must therefore be the case for the above to
hold that26 βTL >
(
βAL
) 1
ν if they are interior, while βTL =
(
βAL
) 1
ν = (αH/αL)
1
ν
if they are not. To show that βTL < β
A
L , evaluate (29) at the value β
T
L = β
A
L
for βAL interior and note that it is negative. Since the left hand side of (29)
is decreasing in βTL , it must be the case that β
T
L < β
A
L .
25This likelihood is equal to (ui(β′))ν/(
∑N
n=1(un(β
′))ν).
26Note that if βAL = αH/αL, the inequality also holds as β
T
L is larger than the shadow
value of βAL to the power 1/ν, and is therefore larger than (αH/αL)
1
ν .
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7.4 Proof of Proposition 2
• Autarky
We define the function:
GA(χ) =
χ
1
ν
(
βAL
) 1
ν
+χ ν−1
ν
χβAL + 1− χ
− (1− χ) 1ν (51)
where βAL is defined by (28) and is itself a function of χ. G
A(χ) is equal to
x
1
ν
Lu
A
L(β
A
L )− x
1
ν
Hu
A
H(1) divided by ζ and is such that if G
A(χ) ≥ 0, policy βAL
wins the majority of votes, while policy β = 1 wins if GA(χ) < 0. Since
βAL ∈ (1, αH/αL], GA(0) = −1 and that GA(1) = 1. Differentiating GA(χ)
gives:
∂GA(χ)
∂χ
=
1
ν
χ
1−ν
ν
(
βAL
) 1
ν
(χβAL + 1− χ)2
[
1 + χ(βAL − 1)(1− ν)
]
+
1
ν
(1− χ) 1−νν
+
χ
1
ν βAL
χβAL + 1− χ
ln(βAL )
ν − 1
ν
(
βAL
)χ ν−1
ν +
∂GA(χ)
∂βAL
∂βAL
∂χ
. (52)
If βAL is interior, ∂G
A(χ)/∂βAL = 0 and the last product is equal to zero.
If βAL is constrained by the upper bound αH/αL, ∂β
A
L/∂χ = 0 and the last
product is also equal to zero. The second line above is therefore positive. By
definition of βAL , we know that:
χ(ν − 1)(1− βAL ) + 1 ≥ 0 (53)
where the inequality is strict if βAL = αH/αL, which ensures that ∂G
A(χ)/∂χ >
0. GA(χ) is thus monotonically increasing on χ ∈ [0, 1] with GA(0) < 0 and
GA(1) > 0. This completes the proof of Proposition 2 for the autarkic case.
• Small open economy
Define:
GT (χ, δ) = (χδ)
1
ν
χδ
(
βTL
)ν
+ (1− χ)βTL
χδ (βTL )
ν
+ (1− χ) − ((1− χ))
1
ν (54)
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where βTL is defined by (29) and is itself a function of χ. δ is defined as in
section 5.1 and allows to anticipate on the proof of the model extensions.
For the purpose of Proposition 2, δ = 1. GT (χ, δ) is equal to x
1
ν
Lu
T
L(β
T
L ) −
x
1
ν
Hu
T
H(1) divided by ζ and is such that if G
T (χ, δ) ≥ 0, policy βTL (δ) wins the
majority of votes, while policy β = 1 wins if GT (χ, δ) < 0. Since βTL (δ) ∈
(1, (αHδH/(αLδL))
1/ν ], GT (0, δ) = −1 and GT (1, δ) = δ 1ν . Differentiating
GT (χ, δ) with respect to χ gives:
∂GT (χ, δ)
∂χ
=
1
ν
χ
1−ν
ν δ
1
ν
χδ
(
βTL
)ν
+ (1− χ)βTL
χδ (βTL )
ν
+ (1− χ) +
(χδ)
1
ν δ
((
βTL
)ν − (βTL)ν+1)
(χδ (βTL )
ν
+ (1− χ))2
+
1
ν
((1− χ)) 1−νν + ∂G
T (χ, δ)
∂βLT
∂βTL
∂χ
. (55)
If βTL is interior, ∂G
T (χ, δ)/∂βTL = 0 and the last term drops out. If β
T
L is
constrained by its upper bound, on the other hand, ∂βTL/∂χ = 0. In both
cases, the last term above drops out. By definition of βTL (δ):
χδ
(
βTL
)ν−1 (
βTL (1− ν) + ν
)
+ (1− χ) ≥ 0⇔
(
βTL
)ν − (βTL)ν+1
χδ (βTL )
ν
+ (1− χ) ≥ −
βTL
νχδ
.(56)
Plugging the above inequality in (55) and rearranging, we obtain:
∂GT (χ, δ)
∂χ
≥ 1
ν
(χδ)
1
ν
δ
(
βTL
)ν − βTL
χδ (βTL )
ν
+ (1− χ) +
1
ν
(1− χ) 1−νν (57)
≥ 1
v
(1− χ) 1ν
χδ(βTL )
ν + (1− χ)
[(
δχ
(1− χ)
)
(βTL )
ν −
(
δχ
(1− χ)
) 1
ν
βTL + 1
]
.
where the square bracket (of the form cν − c + 1) is positive. GT (χ, δ) is
therefore a monotonically increasing function in χ from GT (0, δ) < 0 to
GT (1, δ) > 0 and there exists therefore a unique cutoff χT (δ) such that policy
β = 1 wins if χ < χT (δ) while policy β
T
L (δ) wins otherwise.
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7.5 Proof of Proposition 3
The first part of Proposition 3 requires to show that χT < χA. Noting
that, under the price assumption (17), uAn (1) = u
T
n (1), we have: G
T (χ, 1) −
GA(χ) = x
1
ν
L
(
uAL(β
A
L )− uTL(βTL )
)
. We now show that the following inequali-
ties hold:
uTn (β
T
L ) ≥ uTn
((
βAL
) 1
ν
)
> uAn
(
βAL
)
, n ∈ XL. (58)
The first inequality holds by definition of βTL . The second inequality holds
by combining Lemma 1 with Lemmas 3 and 2. Policy βAL in autarky and
policy
(
βAL
) 1
ν in a small open economy give rise to the same output and Dn
vector. Since the cost of the distortion is lower in a small open economy,
utility is higher in that case. This implies that for any χ, GT (χ) > GA(χ)
and in particular: GT (χA) > G
A(χA) = 0. Since G
T is increasing in χ, it
proves that χT > χA.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 4
From the Proof of Proposition 2, we know that the equilibrium policy in
Proposition 2 also applies for δ 6= 1, where χT and βTL are functions of δ and
where βTL (δ) is given by (33).
The first part of Proposition 4 is shown by totally differentiating (33),
which gives:
dβTL
dδ
δ
βTL
= − β
T
L (ν − 1)− ν
ν(ν − 1)(βTL − 1)
< 0. (59)
The right hand side of the above equation is decreasing in βTL . For β
T
L →∞,
the right hand side is −1/ν, meaning that the left hand side is larger than
−1/ν. Since ν > 1, it implies that ∂(δβTL )/∂δ > 0.
For the second and third parts of Proposition 4, we differentiate GT (χ, δ)
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with respect to δ:
∂GT (χ, δ)
∂δ
=
(χδ)
1
ν
χδβTνL + (1− χ)
[
1
νδ
(χδβTνL + (1− χ)βTL ) +
(1− χ)χβTνL (1− βTL )
χδβTνL + 1− χ
]
,
(60)
where we used the fact that ∂GT (χ, δ)/∂βTL = 0 if β
T
L < (αH/(αLδ))
1
ν and
∂βTL/∂δ = 0 otherwise. Plugging the implicit definition of β
T
L (δ) given by
(33) and rearranging, we obtain:
∂G(χ, δ)
∂δ
=
(χδ)
1
ν
+1
(χδβTνL + 1− χ)2
βT2ν−1L (β
T
L − 1) > 0. (61)
Combined with the fact that ∂G(χ, δ)/∂χ > 0, we obtain χT
′
(δ) < 0. Using
(54), we then show that for δ = 0, χT = 1, implying that there is a δ below
which χT (δ) > χA.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Using E to denote an expectation over α, we write the real income per
efficient unit of labor in sector n under autarky and trade as:
uA(αn, b) = ζ
1−b α
1−b
ν
n
E[α1−b]
= ζ1−bα
1−b
ν
n
κ+ b− 1
κb(κ− 1)1−b (62)
uT (αn, b) = ζ
α
1
ν
−b
n
E[α1−bν ]
(
E[α1−bν+b]
)
= ζα
1
ν
−b
n
(
κ− 1
κ
)b
κ+ bν − 1
κ+ b(ν − 1)− 1(63)
where the second equality corresponds to the case of the Pareto distribu-
tion as defined in Proposition 5. Setting uS(α˜S, b1) = u
S(α˜S, b2) defines the
function α˜S(b1, b2) where the second equality corresponds to the Pareto case:
α˜A(b1, b2) = ζ
−ν
(
E[α1−b1 ]
E[α1−b2 ]
) ν
b2−b1
= ζ−ν
(
κ− 1
κ
)ν (
κ+ b2 − 1
κ+ b1 − 1
) ν
b2−b1
(64)
α˜T (b1, b2) =
(
E[α1−b1ν ]
E[α1−b2ν ]
E[α1−b2(ν−1)]
E[α1−b1(ν−1)]
) 1
b2−b1
=
κ− 1
κ
(
κ+ b2ν − 1
κ+ b1ν − 1
κ+ b1(ν − 1)− 1
κ+ b2(ν − 1)− 1
) 1
b2−b1
(65)
43
The proof of Proposition 5 requires to show that if a policy b2 beats a
policy b1 < b2, it beats any b0 < b1, and that if b1 beats b2 > b1, it beats any
b3 > b2. These imply that the following two conditions should hold:
2
∂α˜(b1, b2)
∂b1
(uS(α˜, b1))
νf(α˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
EXS1
−
∫ α¯
α˜(b1,b2)
∂
(
uS(α, b1)
)ν
∂b1
dF (α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
INTS
< 0 (66)
2
∂α˜(b1, b2)
∂b2
(uS(α˜, b1))
νf(α˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
EXS2
+
∫ α˜(b1,b2)
α
∂
(
uS(α, b2)
)ν
∂b2
dF (α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
INTS
< 0. (67)
In a first step, we show that both inequalities (66) and (67) hold under
the assumptions of Proposition 5. In a second step, we derive the unique
equilibrium policy (38) and (39).
• Step 1
To simplify notation, we define:
∆A = ζ1−b1κ1−κ(κ− 1)κ
(
κ+ b1 − 1
(κ− 1)1−b1κb1
)ν
(α˜A)1−b1−κ (68)
∆T = κ1−κ(κ− 1)κζν
(
κ− 1
κ
)b1ν ( κ+ b1ν − 1
κ+ b1(ν − 1)− 1
)ν
(α˜T )1−b1ν−κ,(69)
where, from the definition of α˜S, the b1 on the right hand side of the above
equations can equivalently be replaced by b2. From the definition of ζ, fur-
thermore:
Log(ζ) =
ν − 1
ν
(∫ ∞
κ−1
κ
αLog(α)dF (α)
)
=
ν − 1
ν
(
Log
(
κ− 1
κ
)
+
1
κ− 1
)
(70)
where the second equality obtains after integration by parts.
The extensive margin EXSi , for i ∈ {1, 2}, S ∈ {A, T} are equal to:
EXAi = 2
∆A
bj − bi
[
Log
(
α˜A
)
+ νLog
(
ζκ
κ− 1
)
− ν
κ+ bi − 1
]
(71)
EXTi = 2
∆T
bj − bi
[
Log
(
α˜Tκ
κ− 1
)
− κ− 1
(κ+ bi(ν − 1)− 1)(κ+ biν − 1)
]
(72)
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where j = 2 if i = 1 and j = 1 if i = 2.
To obtain the intensive margin in autarky, we differentiate uA(α, b) with
respect to b and use integration by parts to show:
INTAi ≤
∆A
κ+ bi − 1
[
1− ν
κ+ bi − 1 + νLog
(
ζκ
κ− 1
)
+ Log(α˜A)
]
, (73)
where the inequality is weak for i = 1 and strict27 for i = 2.
To simplify notation, define x ≡ (bj − bi)/(κ + bi − 1). The sum of the
extensive and the intensive margin are therefore:
EXAi + INT
A
i ≤
∆Aν
(bj − bi)2
[
(2 + x)Log(1 + x)− 2x− ν − 1
ν
x2
]
. (74)
Under the assumption that κ > 2, −1 < x < 1 and the right hand side above
is negative as long as ν > 1/(3(1−Log(2))) = 1.0863, which is the condition
for the right hand side of the equation above to be negative when x = 128.
Differentiating uT (α, b) with respect to b and using integration by parts
for the small open economy:
INT Ti ≤
ν∆T
κ+ biν − 1
[
Log
(
α˜Tκ
κ− 1
)
+
bi(ν − 1)
(κ+ biν − 1)(κ+ bi(ν − 1)− 1)
]
.(75)
To simplify notation, we denote: θi ≡ κ− 1 + biν, τi ≡ κ− 1 + bi(ν − 1) and
ρi ≡ bj − bi. The sum of the extensive and extensive margin is therefore:
EXTi + INT
T
i ≤
∆T
ρ2i
[(
2 +
νρi
θi
)
Log
(
θjτi
θiτj
)
− 2(κ− 1)ρi
θiτi
+
νbi(ν − 1)
θ2i τi
ρ2i
]
(76)
27The strict inequality for i = 2 comes from the fact that INTA2 is equal to the right
hand side of (73) plus a negative term equal to ∆A
(
κ−1
κα˜A
)1−κ−b2 (ν − 1)( 1κ+b2−1 − 1κ−1)
where we use (70).
28If the right hand side of the inequality is negative for x = 1, it is negative for all x. To
see this, differentiate the square bracket 3 times with respect to x, and note that (i) the
third derivative is positive for any x ≤ 1, (ii) the second derivative is negative for x = 0
and (iii) the first derivative is equal to zero for x = 0. We repeat a similar exercise for the
small open economy with more details in the following.
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To show under which conditions the right hand side is negative29, we differ-
entiate the square bracket with respect to ρi (which enters τj = τi+ρi(ν−1)
and θj = θi + ρiν) for a given bi and show that it is equal to zero for ρi → 0.
The second derivative of the square bracket with respect to ρi can be shown
to be negative at ρi → 0 if κ > 2, which, by l’Hopital’s rule, shows that
EXTi + INT
T
i < 0 for ρi → 0. Finally, the third derivative of the square
bracket with respect to ρi is positive on the whole range −b1 < ρi < 1/ν− b1
if κ > 2. This implies that EXTi + INT
T
i < 0 if ρi < 0 (the second derivative
is negative at zero and, by the third derivative, also for any ρi ≤ 0 meaning
that the square bracket is smaller for any ρi < 0 than for ρi = 0, i.e. it is
negative). On the range 0 ≤ ρi < 1/ν on the other hand, the square bracket
is maximized either at ρi = 0 or at ρi = 1/ν − b1. It remains to check under
what condition the square bracket is negative if ρi = 1/ν − b1. At b1 = 0,
the condition for the square bracket in (76) to be negative boils down to:
(2κ− 1)Log
(
κ
κ− 1
ν
)
− 2
ν
< 0 (77)
It can be shown that if the above inequality holds for κ = 2, it holds for
any κ > 2. A sufficient condition for the above to be negative therefore boils
down to 3Log(2/(2− 1/ν))− 2/v < 0, i.e. ν ≥ 1.101. This concludes step 1.
• Step 2
Step 2 showed that if a policy b2 beats b1 < b2, it beats any policy b0 < b1
while if b2 beats b3 > b2, it beats any b4 > b3. If there exists a policy b which
beats b+ δ and b− δ for δ arbitrarily small, it must therefore be the unique
policy equilibrium. A policy bS is therefore the unique policy equilibrium if,
29We here only present the steps taken without carrying them out for the sake of space.
All the steps of the analytical proof can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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for δ → 0:∫ α˜S(bS ,bS−δ)
κ−1
κ
(
uS(α, bS)
)ν
dF (α) ≥
∫ ∞
α˜S(bS ,bS−δ)
(
uS(α, bS − δ))ν dF (α)78)∫ α˜S(bS+δ,bS)
κ−1
κ
(
uS(α, bS + δ)
)ν
dF (α) ≤
∫ ∞
α˜S(bS+δ,bS)
(
uS(α, bS)
)ν
dF (α).(79)
Plugging (62) and (63) in the above conditions and imposing that δ → 0,
these boil down to:∫ α˜A
κ−1
κ
α1−bdF (α) =
∫ ∞
α˜A
α1−bdF (α) and
∫ α˜T
κ−1
κ
α1−bνdF (α) =
∫ ∞
α˜T
α1−bνdF (α)(80)
where α˜S (S ∈ {A, T}) above corresponds to limδ→0 α˜S(b, b+ δ). Using (64),
(65), (70) and applying L’Hopital’s rule shows that:
lim
δ→0
Log
(
αA(b, b+ δ)
)
= Log
(
κ− 1
κ
)
− ν − 1
κ− 1 +
ν
κ+ b− 1 (81)
lim
δ→0
Log
(
αT (b, b+ δ)
)
= Log
(
κ− 1
κ
)
+
κ− 1
(κ+ bν − 1)((κ+ b(ν − 1)− 1))(82)
Plugging these values in (80) gives (38) and (39).
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